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Economic Austerity, Human Rights and Judicial 
Deference: A Case for a More Rigorous Judicial Role 
Husnain Nasim* 
INTRODUCTION 
Economic austerity measures have had a huge impact on the provision of 
welfare for the most vulnerable members of society. Given the cuts to welfare 
benefits, vital services and increasing threats to livelihoods, there is a growing 
body of precedents that challenges the status quo. However, most of these cases 
have been met by total judicial reticence. The central reason for this relates to 
the constitutional division of labour, which is often underpinned by deference-
based arguments that point to the institutional differences between the courts 
and elected branches of government. Understanding the role these factors play 
in the courts’ reasoning, especially in terms of how they affect the outcome in 
cases will be critically examined in Section I. In Section II, I will address 
whether there is a good case for greater judicial engagement in the adjudication 
and enforcement of social rights under the current integrated approach, by 
which courts read socio-economic interests into civil and political rights. By 
answering in the affirmative, I will argue that deference-based arguments as well 
as the oversimplified dichotomy between civil/political vis-à-vis social rights is 
unsustainable. I will argue that there is a good case for judicial engagement in 
the adjudication of social rights. As such, I opt for a more limited claim, namely, 
that an incremental activist approach which centers around the importance of 
dialogue may work. Lastly, I examine the unique constitutional structure of the 
UK, particularly sections 3 and 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998, and the way in 
which dialogue fostered between the judicial and legislative branches may open 
room for a more engaging approach to social rights adjudication. 
* BA (Cantab), LLM (LSE). I would like to acknowledge the efforts of my supervisor,
Professor Conor Gearty, in guiding me through this project and my parents, Zarina and
Nasim, for their unconditional love and support.
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I. AUSTERITY IN BRITAIN: EFFECTS AND THE JUDICIAL
APPROACH 
Social Rights Under Threat 
The onset of the 2007 to 2008 global financial and economic crises had a major 
impact on the enjoyment of social rights in the United Kingdom. The focus in 
this Section is to analyse the damage that has been done by responses to the 
crises, with a critical emphasis on austerity measures that involve the reduction 
of public expenditure on vital services, cash benefits or benefits-in-kind (e.g. 
school facilities, local library funding, and care homes). We will also look at the 
role human rights law has played in what has been called ‘judicial protection for 
the worst of the attacks on the poor made by the Coalition government’.1  
First, what is meant when we talk about “social rights”? For the purposes 
of this essay, reference to social rights includes rights to housing, health, 
education, and social security, that is, the key human rights and social minimum 
needed for subsistence or well-being, social participation as well as the proper 
exercise of autonomy. The arrival of the welfare state after WWII gave rise to 
the recognition of state responsibility for securing our social rights. At the same 
time, the growth of the welfare state and the range of benefits that it offers have 
often attracted criticism, including claims that people are “sponging off” the 
government and abusing the system. Whilst there is a general consensus on the 
need to cut down on abuse of the welfare system, sweeping generalisations have 
the tendency to underplay the difficult and often desperate circumstances of 
benefit recipients, often some of the most vulnerable members of society (e.g. 
abused women, the disabled, children and the elderly). Beyond the rhetoric, a 
more microscopic look at the predicament of welfare recipients reveals the vital 
role welfare plays in ensuring the survival of livelihoods, integrating citizens into 
society and respecting their dignity. 
According to a briefing by the Centre for Welfare Reform, people living in 
poverty, one in five of the population, will bear 39% of all cuts, including cuts to 
benefits and funding to local government which includes social care and 
1 C Gearty, ‘Human Rights in a Neo-liberal World’ (The Stephen Livingstone Tenth 
Anniversary Lecture, Queen’s University Belfast, 27 November 2014). 
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community services.2 Vulnerable groups like the disabled, who make up one in 
thirteen of the population will bear 20% of the burden, making them nine times 
more likely than the average person to have been affected.3 According to 
Oxfam, the UK’s five richest families have amassed a total wealth of £28.2 
billion, more wealth than the whole bottom 20 per cent (12.6 million) of the 
population.4 According to a report by the Institute for Social and Economic 
Research, the past coalition’s policies on welfare and taxation exacerbated the 
wealth divide.5  It is no wonder that Policy Exchange has found that over a 
million households cannot afford to heat their homes sufficiently despite having 
a household member in work.6  The growing pattern of inequality and 
concentration of wealth in the hands of the few is also demonstrated by the 
Centre for Economic and Business Research, which found that in excess of half 
of Britain’s wealth is controlled by the richest 10 per cent and that the poorest 
20 per cent will have to spend £1,910 more than they earn whilst the wealthiest 
richest 20 per cent of the population will on average put £18,780 into their 
savings.7 What is particularly worrying is the disproportionate impact and 
burden this will have on already vulnerable groups. It is thus unsurprising to see 
greater willingness to challenge government measures in the courts. But on what 
basis have these challenges emerged and how have the courts reacted? 
2 M O’Hara, ‘Tory austerity will eat up the welfare state’ Guardian (13 April 2015) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/apr/13/tory-austerity-welfare-
state-conservative> accessed 5 March 2016. 
3 ibid. 
4 L Elliott, ‘Britain’s five richest families worth more than poorest 20 per cent’ Guardian 
(17 March 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2014/mar/17/oxfam-report-
scale-britain-growing-financial-inequality>  accessed 5 March 2016.  
5 P De Agostini, J Hills and H Sutherland, ‘Were we really all in it together? The 
distributional effects of the UK Coalition government’s tax-benefit policy changes’ 
(2014) Social Policy in a Cold Climate Working Paper 10 
<http://www.trustforlondon.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/Where-we-really-all-
in-it-together.pdf> accessed 5 March 2016. 
6 R Howard, ‘Warmer Homes, Improving fuel poverty and energy effiency policy in the 
UK’ (Policy Exchange 2015) <http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/publications/ 
category/item/warmer-homes-improving-fuel-poverty-and-energy-efficiency-policy-in-
the-uk> accessed 5 March 2016. 
7 H Meyer, ‘UK’s richest can save £18,680 a year as poorest 40% spend more than they 
earn’ Guardian (29 May 2014) <http://www.the guardian.com/uk-
news/2014/may/29/richest-uk-save-poorest-spend-crisis-post-office-data> accessed 5 
March 2016. 
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Judicial Engagement but in Extremis 
Despite the courts’ unwillingness to read or expand rights to welfare benefits 
under the Human Rights Act 1998, which incorproates into domestic law the 
rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention of Human 
Rights (ECHR), there is some evidence of the courts using the traditional list of 
civil and political rights to protect some of the most vulnerable members of 
society. In what has been come to be described as the ‘integrated approach,’8 
courts have been willing to read social interests and rights into the civil and 
political rights listed in the ECHR. Although mention of social rights is not 
explicitly found in many of the judgments, it is fair to state that the courts are 
using the current regime to protect what are known as vital social rights to social 
security and an adequate standard of living. This is important because there is 
no such wholesale recognition of social rights within the common law or 
ECHR.  
In the case of Limbuela,9 all three asylum claimants were barred from 
receiving state support by operation of s 55(1) of the Nationality, Immigration 
and Asulym Act 2002.The court acknowledged that the question of whether and 
if so in what circumstances, welfare support in the form of food, housing and 
other basic necessities should be given at the expense of the state to asylum 
seekers is an intensely political question. Nevertheless, the court found that 
while it is not the function of Article 3 to prescribe a minimum standard of 
social support, the refusal of state support combined with the denial of the right 
to work amounted to ‘treatment’. 10 Interestingly, this decision was handed 
down at a time when the then Labour government claimed to be in the grip of 
an asylum crisis; a classic polycentric situation which could easily have been used 
as a deference according factor. What is also revealing, is the approach of the 
courts, especially in opting for practical guidance rather than a precise criterion 
in defining the Article 3 threshold. Lord Bingham, whilst adhering to this 
approach, nevertheless commented on when the threshold to trigger Article 3 
may be crossed: ‘if a late applicant with no means and no alternative support, is, 
by the deliberate action of the state, denied shelter, food, or the most basic 
necessities of life.’11 The interesting question which follows is whether this 
8 C Gearty and V Mantouvalou, Debating Social Rights (Hart Publishing 2011) 114-115. 
9 R(Adam, Limbuela and Tesema) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66. 
10 ibid para 13 per Lord Hope. 
11 ibid para 7 per Lord Bingham. 
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approach could be used as a launch pad to expand Article 3 claims to other 
scenarios, including, for example, to other vulnerable members of society, and 
how far courts would be willing to stretch the notion of the “most basic 
necessities of life”. On the face of it, it would seem his Lordship was specifically 
referring to asylum seekers and those left destitute as a result of the regime 
implemented and action taken by the state. There seems to be little wiggle room 
for what has come to be known as rights inflation, and given the absolute nature 
of Article 3 which disqualifies any proportionality balancing, there may be a 
defensible case against using this right as a basis to prescribe a minimum 
standard of social support. Lastly, this case can be characterised as what may be 
called an in extremis anomaly, an example of life threatening and serious 
circumstances triggering a strong judicial response. Indeed, when we discuss 
cases involving facts less extreme than those in Limbuela, we find that the courts 
opt for a more deferential approach.  
Notwithstanding this, there is further evidence that demonstrates the 
courts’ willingness to engage in meticulous analysis of government social policy. 
In the joined cases of Burnip, Trengove & Gorry12 the Court of Appeal ruled that 
the housing benefit rules were discriminatory against disabled people and in 
breach of Article 14 of the ECHR read with Article 1 Protocol 1. The key 
problem here were the effects of a greater shortfall between the amount of 
housing benefit received and the actual amount of rent the local authority had to 
pay each week than for an equivalent non-disabled person under the Housing 
Benefit Regulations (2006). Henderson J, in determining whether the breach was 
justified, found that the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions had not 
established an objective and reasonable justification for the discriminatory effect 
of the housing benefit criteria. In particular, despite the wide margin of 
appreciation accorded to the State in ECHR law in relation to measures 
concerning economic and social policy, he was13 able to distinguish this case 
from AM(Somalia)14 in which the Court of Appeal held that discrimination was 
justified, on the grounds that Burnip’s case did not relate to immigration, that the 
exception from the standard housing benefit criteria was sought only for a 
specific category of claimaints (unlike all disabled people in AM(Somalia)) with 
severe disabilities and that Parliament had already seen fit to amend the housing 
12 Burnip v Birmingham City Council & Anor [2012] EWCA Civ 629. 
13 ibid para 64 per Henderson J. 
14 AM(Somalia) v Entry Clearance Officer [2009] EWCA Civ 634. 
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regulations. Here we see a range of factors, peculiar to this case, which led to a 
favourable result for the claimaint. The discriminatory effect of the regulations 
on those who had severe disabilities, a limited category of claimants, a discrete 
group, as well the fact that this issue only arose because the claimaints were 
housed in the private rental sector, clearly shows that the unique circumstances 
warranted a more critical approach. What the courts would have decided if one 
of the three distinguishing features were absent in Gorry’s case  cannot be 
predicted definitively, but again this case shows the degree of difference and 
uniqueness required to diminish the grip of the margin of appreciation accorded 
in social policy areas. 
Despite the optimism these cases have given to proponents arguing for 
pure application of the proportionality test (devoid of deferential sub-tests), and 
at a time where the effects of austerity and welfare reforms are coming to hit the 
most vulnerable in society hardest, hope for the development of social and 
economic protections under the current civil/political list of rights has been met 
by what has been called ‘judicial protection for the worst of the then Coalition’s 
attacks on the poor.’15 Courts have relied on the classic constitutional division of 
labour-type arguments: essentially, that such matters are beyond what the 
judiciary considers as its role in the broader constitutional landscape. The 
reasons offered include the perceived superior comparative democratic 
legitimacy of the elected branches, their expertise in matters concerning social 
and economic policy, relative institutional competence as well as the polycentric 
concerns these cases bring, all of which seem to be deeply embedded and 
hardwired into the courts’ psyche and approach, and all recurring reasons and 
drivers of judicial reasoning evident in these cases. This deep conservatism and 
unwillingness to countenance the possibility of expanding the scope of the 
current rights is disappointing. In order to refute the current approach we need 
to understand what role these factors play in the courts’ reasoning and how this 
affects the outcome of cases. 
The Current Deferential Judicial Approach 
At the outset, it is important to clarify the nature of the relationship between the 
doctrine of proportionality and deference. According to Kavanagh,16 deference 
15 Gearty (n 1) 8. 
16 A Kavanagh, Constitutional Review under the UK Human Rights Act (Cambridge University 
Press 2009) 237. 
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refers to the intensity with which the questions that form part of the 
proportionality enquiry are applied. Deference plays a crucial role in determining 
whether laws or executive decisions satisfy the doctrine of proportionality, as it 
sets the intrusiveness of review the court will undertake in determining the 
competing values. Thus, if more deference is applied to a case, then the courts 
will be less required in terms of strength of argument and supportive evidence 
to decide that a measure is disproportionate. What is in question is the rigour 
with which the test is applied.  
In R(JS) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,17 although the court found 
that the benefit cap policy was discriminatory and had a disproportionate impact 
on women contrary to Article 14 of the ECHR taken in conjunction with Article 
8 or Article 1 Protocol 1, it held that the Benefit Cap (Housing Benefit) 
Regulations 2012, made according to s96 of the Welfare Reform Act 2012, was 
not manifestly without reasonable foundation. The key here is the tone and 
approach used by the court. Elias LJ stated that the ‘the division of resources of 
the state and more particularly the question to what extent state funds should be 
made available to those in need for one reason or another is par excellence a 
political question’.18 Reminding the court of the need to ‘tread with extreme 
caution’ given that Parliament had considered many of the claims identified by 
the claimaints and had ‘chosen not to make the exceptions they seek,’ Elias LJ 
also referred to the fact that in many cases the resultant hardships were 
alleviated by the discretionary housing payments (DHPs)—a factor which 
carried great weight in the proportionality exercise.19  Despite admitting that the 
cap was too parsimonious, he ended his consideration of the justification 
question by pointing towards this ‘ultimately being a policy isssue.’20 Evidence 
of a clearly less rigorous proportionality test in operation is evident here, owing 
primarily to the perceived superior expertise, democratic legitimacy as well as 
assumed superior competence of the elected branches to deal with such issues, 
not to mention the concern about the polycentric nature of resource allocation 
decisions. But is there more consistent use of this type of reasoning?  
The case of R(MA) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions21 concerns the 
removal of the spare room subsidy, also known as the “bedroom tax”, where 
 
 
17 [2013] EWHC 3350 (QB). 
18 ibid para 85. 
19 ibid para 87. 
20 ibid para 95. 
21 [2013] EWHC 2213 (QB). 
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housing benefit for tenants in the social rented sector will be reduced where 
there are one or more spare rooms. The claim related to the Housing Benefit 
(Amendment) Regulations 2012, which the claimaints argued unlawfully 
discriminated, under Article 14 read with Article 1 of the First Protocol of the 
ECHR, against disabled tenants, as they failed to make adequate provision for 
their needs. Despite the finding of discrimination, the crucial issue turned on the 
test used to determine whether it was justified. Laws LJ, in applying the 
“manifestly without reasonable foundation” test, found that the measure was 
justified given that the policy has been properly considered through the 
application of the public sector equality duty and the absence of a precise class 
of persons (those who need extra bedroom space by reason of disability) who 
could be identified in practical and objective terms and sufficiently differentiated 
from other groups equally in need of extra space22 —all powerful factors that 
weighed heavily at the justification stage.23 He also alluded to the provision for 
extra funding through the discretionary housing payment in relation to the 
difficulties disabled persons might face despite not being defined as a class and 
found that this could not be said to be a ‘disproportionate approach to the 
difficulties which those persons faced’.24 Unsurprisingly, when this case 
proceeded to the Court of Appeal,25 it was held that the measures were justified. 
What is key to note is the reference to the Regulations as forming part of what 
was a ‘high policy decision’, including reducing the budget deficit and welfare 
reform designed to control the cost of the social security budget.26 Dyson LJ 
also laid down the high threshold which must be met to find that a measure is 
unjustfiable because it does not have an ‘objective or reasonable justification,’ 
on the basis that pointing out ‘some flaws’ in the scheme or ‘to conclude that 
the justification is not particularly convincing’, would not suffice, as, for him, 
the stringent nature of the test requires that there be a ‘serious flaw’ in the 
scheme which produces an unreasonable discriminatory effect.27 Finally, he also 
referred to the need for the court to be ‘cautious’ about finding unlawful 
discrimination of a statutory instrument which had been passed by affirmative 
resolution of both houses of Parliament and also placed weight on the fact that 
 
 
22 ibid para 60. 
23 ibid para 88. 
24 ibid para 88. 
25 R(MA) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions [2014] EWCA Civ 13. 
26 ibid para 54 per Dyson LJ. 
27 ibid para 80. 
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some of the ‘principal complaints’ made by the claimaints were raised and 
discussed during debates and rejected.28 But in summing up his overall 
conclusion of the justification issue, Dyson LJ confirms my suspicion that what 
is really happening is a form of backpedaling towards a Wednesbury standard of 
review. The approach, laid out in Stec v United Kingdom,29 is that the court in 
matters concerning social or economic policy will generally respect the 
legislature’s policy choice unless it is ‘manifestly without reasonable 
foundation’.30  Despite arguing that the Stec test is not identical to the 
irrationality standard, he stated that when considering the arguments posited by 
the Secretary of State, ‘his reasons are far from irrational.’31 This leads to a major 
concern about the nature of the Stec test, does it mirror the highly deferential 
standard found in Wednesbury unreasonableness? If so, are deference-based 
factors and concerns about the possible knock-on effects (financially or 
politically) when ruling on the unlawfulness of a policy the conceptual 
justifications of this highly deferential test? The answer, as evidenced above, 
must surely be a resounding yes. 
This leads us to R(SG) v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions,32 previously 
known as R(JS) in the High Court and Court of Appeal. This case concerns a 
challenge to the benefit cap in relation to the amount of welfare benefits that 
could be claimed in non-working households, on the basis that it breached 
Article 14 of the ECHR by unjustifiably discriminating between male and 
female. In dismissing the appeal, the majority held that the legitimate aims of 
securing the economic well-being of the country, incentivising work and 
imposing a reasonable limit on the total amount that a household could receive 
in benefits were sufficiently important in justifying the benefit cap and were not 
manifestly without reasonable foundation. For our purposes, it is important to 
highlight the factors which determined the intensity of review performed by 
Lord Reed. He stated, that despite the Human Rights Act adjusting the 
respective constitutional roles of the courts, executive and legislature, it ‘does 
not eliminate the differences between them: differences, for example, in relation 
to their composition, their expertise, their accountability and their legitimacy’.33 
28 ibid para 81. 
29 (2006) 43 EHRR 1017. 
30 ibid para 16. 
31 ibid para 82. 
32 [2015] UKSC 16. 
33 ibid para 92. 
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Moreover, Lord Reed added that certain matters are by their nature ‘more 
suitable for determination by Government or Parliament than by the courts,’ 
and that courts take this into account when detemining the compatibility of 
Convention rights with executive action or legislation, by giving ‘weight to the 
determination of those matters by the primary decision make’.34 Since the issues 
of proportionality and justifiability concerned social and economic policy that 
had ‘major implications for public expenditure,’35 which are ‘pre-eminently the 
function of democratic institutions,’ the courts, he said, would ‘give due weight 
to the considered assessment made by those institutions’.36  
What is evident is that the courts, in cases concerning state benefits and 
allocation of resources, apply a less rigorous and highly deferential approach in 
determining whether a breach of a right is justifiable. Although it could be 
argued that the word “manifestly” in the Stec test might appear to indicate a 
more rigorous standard than the traditional Wednesbury analysis, it could at the 
very least be argued that the Stec test looks to be as deferential as Wednesbury. 
This issue leads us to the core of this paper. Are the courts justified in lowering 
the intensity of review, and is deference-based reasoning justified? Is there a case 
for more rigorous scrutiny of government measures by simply applying the 
proportionality test without lowering the intensity of review or incorporating 
deferential sub-tests? 
II. JUDICIAL ENGAGEMENT OR RETICENCE?
In this Section I will argue that there is a good case for greater judicial 
engagement in the adjudication of social rights under the integrated approach. 
Although I do point to the need to apply the proportionality test devoid of 
highly deferential sub-tests, my aim is not so much to demonstrate how this may 
be done; or to endorse the use of either the current civil and political rights 
apparatus to include vital social rights (evident in the case law above) or to 
altogether derive new social rights such as the right to social security or an 
adequate standard of living, but to clear the way by addressing a logically prior 
question relating to whether the courts should engage in more rigorous 
adjudication of social rights. Unsurprisingly, some of the key arguments made 
34 ibid. 
35 ibid para 93. 
36 ibid. 
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against justiciability overlap and intersect with arguments that often feature in 
reasons for according deference to the elected branches. As such, I question the 
assumptions on which deference-based arguments are based and deconstruct 
the oversimplified dichotomy between civil/political and social rights. I end by 
pointing to the lessons we can draw from R(SG) v SSWP.37 
The Justiciability Debate 
One of the key concerns about the justiciability of social rights relates to the 
conceptual differences and nature of civil and political rights when compared to 
social rights. Claims often point to the i) negative/positive nature of 
civil/political and social rights in terms of the duties and obligations they place 
on states,38 ii) the idea that, as rights to resources, social rights may not be 
achievable and practicable when resources are in short supply, especially 
following a devastating financial crisis, whereas it is assumed that civil and 
political rights are always achieveable, and iii) that the obligations imposed by 
social rights are imperfect and vague, in contrast to more precise civil and 
political rights.39  
So is there anything going for these types of arguments? On closer scrutiny 
we find that these claims are highly questionable. For instance, claim i) which 
seeks to distinguish the nature of civil and political from social rights based on 
the type of obligations they impose is based on a misconception and over-
simplified demarcation between the two. According to Liebenberg, all human 
rights require a combination of negative and positive conduct from states and 
require deiffering amounts of resources.40 For example, an individual’s political 
right to vote41 cannot be guaranteed without the state providing the organisation 
and infrastructure necessary so that elections can be held at certain intervals. 
Moreover, it is not necessarily the case that social rights impose solely positive 
37 R(SG) (n 32). 
38 A Nolan, B Porter and M Langford, ‘The Justiciability of Social and Economic Rights: 
An Updated Appraisal’ [2007] NYU Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice 
Working Paper Series No.15 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id 
=1434944> accessed 5 March 2016. 
39 O O’Neill, ‘The Dark Side of Human Rights’ (2005) 81(2) International Affairs 427. 
40 S Liebenberg, ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and its Implications for South Africa’ (1995) 11 SAJHR 359, 362. 
41 ibid 368. 
Husnain Nasim 
obligations, for instance, where an individual enjoys a social right to health or 
housing, the state could be prohibited from acting in a way which would violate 
that right by withdrawing the finances needed to maintain health centres or 
where restrictive zoning would force shelters provided for the homeless out of 
an area.42 In fact, the distinction does not stand. Yet, it may still be argued that 
social rights demand a greater share of resource allocation and thus impose 
more duties on the state in comparison to civil and political rights. This may be 
true, but it is key to remember that the difference distinguishes the two in terms 
of degree more than in kind.43  
With regard to claim ii) it is simply wrong to assert that civil and political 
rights are always realisable because they are costless, whereas social rights are 
heavily resource dependent, and thus cannot be satisfied in absence of sufficient 
resources. As has been argued, whether or not a right is costless depends on the 
obligation in question, as opposed to the classification of the right imposing that 
obligation as civil/political or social in nature. Indeed, we need only compare 
the great expenditure, in terms of the training, salaries and administration costs 
required to ensure that institutions can at least claim to have the competency 
and capacity to deliver a fair trial,44 to the fact that positive obligations with 
respect to social rights may, in the long-term, save the state expenditure or cost 
nothing at all. Take, for example, investment in education and removing barriers 
to equality of opportunity or life chances, both of which may reduce state 
budgets needed for social security or unemployment. As such, the net gain may 
outweigh the short-term cost. Lastly, it is also key to remember that the 
misconceived notion of civil and political rights, as not requiring extensive 
expenditure, is due to the social fact that many of the social systems required to 
guarantee such rights have been in existence for a long time. The misconception 
merely reflects the bias domestically and internationally towards civil and 
political rights, which are seen as less controversial and assumed to have no 
serious effects on the distribution of resources—a claim which is simply not 
true. 
What about the final claim? Liebenberg has pointed out that the reason 
why ‘the content of many social and economic rights is less well-defined than 
42 ibid. 
43 P Alston and G Quinn, ‘The Nature and Scope of States Parties’ Obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 9(2) Hum Rts Q 
156, 183-184. 
44 European Convention of Human Rights, Article 6. 
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civil and political rights is more a reflection of their exlcusion from processes of 
adjudication than of their inherent nature’.45  Indeed, it is a known fact that 
social rights have been historically excluded from the process of judicial 
adjudication in the United Kingdom, so that their meaning has not concretised 
over time. Moreover, it could also be argued that the open and vague nature of 
key civil and political rights, such as the right to life, liberty or private life, are 
equally as vague as their social counterparts, and have also been construed 
broadly to apply to a broad range of circumstances. On the other hand, some 
social rights such as the right to an adequate standard of living can be calculated 
with precision, based on, for instance, what is agreed to be a living wage or the 
cost of living in a particular geographical region or area. As such, these arbitrary 
and untrue distinctions between the two type of rights do not logically stand.  
 
Legitimacy, Expertise, Institutional Concerns and Polycentricity  
 
This leads us to some of the central arguments which underpin the case law 
addressed in Section I. The key arguments relate to the perceived comparative 
advantages the courts believe that the elected bodies have over them, and 
especially in relation to the resolution of issues concerning social rights and 
governmental social/economic policy. By first understanding the claims and 
then deconstructing and challenging the assumptions on which they are based, I 
hope to expose the fallacies that drive judicial reticence when confronted with 
social rights claims under the integrated approach.  
According to Kavanagh,46 courts always owe a duty of minimal deference 
to parliamentary and executive decision-making. Minimal deference, she argues, 
is the minimal presumptive weight in favour of the legislative or executive 
decision. That is, the decisions made by Parliament or the executive be treated 
with respect in the sense that they should be taken as a bona fide attempt to 
solve whatever social problem they set out to tackle. On the other hand, 
substantial deference, which has to be earned by the elected branches is only 
warranted when the courts perceive themselves to suffer from institutional 
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shortcomings.47 For instance, in the realm of national security, it is often argued 
that due to the fact that certain information is kept secret by the executive, with 
the result that the court does not have access to all information on which a 
primary decision is based, the court will be inclined to pay more deference. 
Given the gap in information, it will be unsure about the effects of its decision 
on public safety. Similarly, in the realm of social and economic policy it could be 
argued that given the implications of a social policy decision, which forms part 
of a larger goal of securing macro-economic stability, the risky nature of 
granting an individual or a particular group of individuals (due to the 
individualised nature of court hearings) protection at the expense of others, as 
well as deep ideological disagreement amongst political parties over how to 
restructure the welfare system, courts are right to judge themselves to be ill-
suited and institutionally inferior when it comes to dealing with these hotly 
contested policy areas. 
As such, one of the main grounds for deferring relates to the argument 
from institutional competence. The argument here is that when a case deals with 
an issue that would require widespread or radical reform of various interlinked 
areas of the law, judges will sometimes pay substantial deference to the superior 
law-making competence of Parliament. The assumption is that Parliament is 
best equipped to deal with such issues. Similarly, proponents of deference may 
argue, given the polycentric48 nature of an issue, especially welfare policy and 
benefits, which often interlock with decisions relating to budgetary allocations 
that form part of a larger unified policy to incentivise work and shift the burden 
of welfare into society, that courts may be justified in placing great weight on 
the executive’s judgment. It is also alleged that that the adversarial nature of 
judicial proceedings makes the courts ill-suited to make polycentric decisions. 
The example often cited is the Bellinger case,49 in which the House of Lords 
decided against interpreting the Matrimonial Causes Act (1973) compatibly with 
the European Convention as this raised issues ‘whose solutions calls for 
extensive inquiry and the widest public consultation and discussion’.50 For the 
court, it was Parliament which had the law-making ability to deal with the varied 
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subject-matter and only Parliament could comprehensively deal with this area of 
law.  
A second similar ground relates to the courts’ disparity in expertise, 
qualification and experience, when it comes to matters relating to public 
policy.51 The argument is aimed at capturing the difference between the task of 
the courts and the elected branches – that courts are experts in matters of law, 
whereas the latter are experts in policy formulation and implementation. Given 
the different functions of the two institutions, it is argued that the courts ought 
to remain within their remit and show deference in cases involving contentious 
policy questions. 
The third and final ground relates to the perceived superior democratic 
legitimacy of Parliament and the executive in comparison to the courts.52 The 
claim is that as laws are passed by a democratically representative and elected 
Parliament, courts should pay deference to the view of Parliament as to what is 
in the interest of the public. One objection that is also made in relation to the 
legitimacy of adjudication concerning social rights is the counter-majoritarian 
nature of such adjudication.53 The claim is that administration of the public 
purse or formulation of social policy should only be carried out by the 
legitimately elected representatives of the people. 
Unconvincing Arguments and Lessons from R(SG) v SSWP 
First I will address the argument from institutional competence and the 
contention that the courts are incapable of dealing with polycentric tasks. It may 
very well be true that a polycentric situation will have complex knock-on effects 
beyond those conceivable in a case, but as has been pointed out, this issue is not 
unique to claims involving social rights claims. As Nolan argues, civil and 
political rights claims made by one group of people or an individual may equally 
impact on the rights of others.54 Such claims also have budgetary consequences 
and may also have unforeseeable policy and administrative implications. For 
instance, a ruling on the state of prisons with regard to Article 3 of the ECHR 
may have massive implications for state funding of prisons, to ensure that 
51 Brady (n 47). 
52 ibid. 
53 J King, Judging Social Rights (Cambridge University Press 2012) 12. 
54 Brady (n 47).18. 
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prisoners are not treated in an inhuman and degrading way. Yet, it could be 
argued that the impact in terms of degree is much higher in cases concerning 
welfare policy as welfare constitutes a high percentage of total budgetary 
spending. However, this does not itself demonstrate why adjudicating on a 
social right would necessarily have complex effects beyond those present in a 
case when compared to a ruling on the state of prisons potentially held to 
violate prisoners’ Article 3 rights. This leads to the heart of the claim – there is 
no room for judicial reticence or deference in determining whether or not rights 
have been breached. In particular, I point to the joined cases in Burnip,55 where 
one of the claimaint Gorry’s disabled children was disadvantaged by the 
application of neutral criteria. What this case shows is that it is wrong to 
presume that the legislature is always more competent in dealing with 
polycentric cases. In fact, it has been pointed out that lack of overall 
accountability and transparency in the budget setting process, failure to consider 
rival evidence and a trend in responding to the most powerful lobby groups may 
prove to be obstacles to effective accountability of government.56 The judicial 
branch, it could be argued, given its competence in matters of principle, fairness, 
equality and critical examination of the details of a case may be ideally suited in 
considering the rights of those minorities who may not be at the forefront of 
the minds of those in the political process. This argument is supported by the 
fact that many civil societies, non-governmental organisations and charities are 
intervening and being asked to submit evidence on the effects and possible 
alternatives available in certain social policy areas. As such, the judical process 
may provide another layer of accountability by bringing to the forefront the 
negative impact of policies that turn a blind eye to key issues and are 
nevertheless knowingly pursued by government, and shed light on other more 
equitable and proportionate responses that were not considered by the 
government. 
But what about the perceived lack of expertise? It is key to remember that 
what I am advocating is a more engaging approach for courts deciding on 
whether a right has been breached in accordance with the law, not to design 
policies or allocate funding for a budget. In fact, I want to dispel the notion of 
comparative inferior expertise in matters concerning policy. It seems as if the 
bar has been set unrealistically high. It is true that judges are not politicians, but 
55 Burnip (n 12). 
56 Brady (n 47). 
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that does not mean they are not competent enough to at least critically examine 
whether a policy is justifiable and whether it meets the aims it claims to achieve. 
Indeed, judges spend years working their way up to the higher courts and often 
develop expertise and skills to understand, analyse and criticise policies. Given 
the level of competence already present in the adjudicative system, it makes 
sense, as Foley argues, that the perceived institutional differences be eliminated 
if not reduced.57 Foley contends that it would be better if the courts were 
provided with the requisite information, which is already the case in most cases, 
and that courts hear evidence from expert witnesses and their views on whether 
governmental measures are necessary to achieve their desired objectives, again 
something which is already part of the judicial procedure.58  So we see that 
courts are not necessarily handicapped and have the foundational skills to deal 
with these types of issues. 
We now come to the legitimacy argument. Is the argument watertight? For 
two reasons it is not. Feldman argues against relying on the democratic 
acccountability of politicians for two reasons.59 Firstly, he argues that 
democratic considerations are not the sole basis for legitimate policy-based 
decision-making, as in his perspective the legitimacy of the courts derives from 
the obligation to justify decisions publicly, by means of rational arguments.60 
Reasons are to be formulated by reference to objective standards, with authority 
derived from a source other than the opinions of an individual judge and the 
independence of the judiciary from the political arms of government, 
guaranteeing an unbiased assessment of the legality of the acts and decisions of 
the executive. He views judicial independence from the political arm as a 
positive feature and believes that the legitimacy of the courts is a way of 
challenging the common conception of the executive as the bearer of greater 
legitimacy. Indeed, this places the judiciary in a better position to adjudicate fully 
on the proportionality test as it has to base its decisions on legal norms, whereas 
the government only justifies itself so far as it is required to do so by Parliament. 
As such, these unique characteristics of the courts, which go to the heart of the 
rule of law, form a forceful basis for the legitimacy of judicial decision-making. 
 
 
57 B Foley, Deference and the Presumption of Constitutionality (Institute of Public 
Administration, Dublin 2008) p210-255. 
58 ibid 271-8. 
59 D Feldman, ‘Human Rights, Terrorism and Risk: the Roles of Politicians and Judges’ 
[2006] PL 364. 
60 ibid 375. 
Husnain Nasim 
 
Therefore, the assessment of the executive cannot be final, as the rule of law 
demands that the courts remain the ultimate decision-makers on matters of law.  
Another line of argument draws on Dworkin’s idea that the decision of the 
majority is only legitimate if it is a majority in a community of equals.61 He 
distinguishes between statistical and communal democracy, and argues that 
communal democracy is key in all charters of rights. For Dworkin, a democratic 
decision is legitimate if people have expressed their will from a position of 
political equality, which is inconceivable without a basic minimum level of 
subsistence and material position for all. For instance, can it really be claimed 
that citizens, such as lone mothers or the severely disabled, who are shackled by 
concerns about homelessness or fuel poverty due to the disproportionate impact 
of welfare cuts, are able be to meaningfully and optimally participate in the 
democratic process if they are primarily concerned about putting food on the 
table or meeting rent payments? In this way, in order to ensure that there is 
equality in society, especially when the government errs, it is the duty of the 
courts to ensure that social rights adjudication is not beyond their constitutional 
responsibility. Without these considerations ingrained in the court’s psyche, we 
cannot truly claim to be a democracy.  
Thus, judicial protection of social rights remedies some of the deficiencies 
of our democratic system.62 It is critical to note here that courts should not rely 
on deference-based arguments when the effect of a measure or statute is 
discriminatory and an affront to equality. The very legitimacy of the courts rests 
on its ability to protect the individual from the majority, who in the name of 
democracy, claims to be the supreme and final arbiter, but in fact, is manifesting 
the tyranny of the majority. Given that the courts have this ability to scrutinise, 
it is disappointing to see that the courts lack the courage to be creative, 
especially because it exposes the judiciary as putting the concept of majority rule 
above the value of political equality to the detriment of the court’s reputation as 
protector of this fundamental value. Both overcoming the court’s inferiority 
complex towards the majority, and acknowledging the duty that courts have in 
protecting equality, will help remove current barriers to judicial engagement in 
the adjudication of social rights. 
In this instance, is there any evidence of the courts’ ability to logically 
tackle cases involving social policy, that would shed doubt on arguments relating 
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to competence, expertise and legitimacy? Firstly, I am wary of arguments that 
posit broad aims relating to fairness between those inside and outside of work, 
saving public money and incentivising work and promoting long-term 
behavioural change, which is what was argued by the government in R(SG) v 
SSWP.63 The dilemma for the courts is that such arguments may overwhelm or 
frighten the judiciary when in fact all that is required is rigorous consideration of 
whether the aims specified by the government are sufficient to justify 
discriminatory treatment. The aim should be to test the veracity of the 
government’s claims and consider whether the government is trying to use them 
as a smokescreen to push forward unjustifiable policy aims. For example, 
although the government in R(SG) claimed to be incentivising work and 
promoting behavioural change, it accepted that this aim ‘may be less pertinent 
for those who are not required to work,’ and ultimately fell back on the 
argument that it sought to make ‘fiscal savings and creating a system which is 
fairer as between those receiving out of work benefits and working 
households’.64 What is evident and worrying about this type of fallback 
argument is that the government was insistent on getting its policy through 
regardless of the discriminatory effects of the benefit cap policy on lone parents 
(mostly women who are unable to work given their family size and the age of 
their children) and young children. Moreover, reliance on the fallback argument 
of achieving fairness between those receiving out of work benefits and working 
households could easily have been discarded by the courts, as the government’s 
claim of achieving fairness between two groups improperly fused the 
involuntary plight of lone parents unable to work (who without benefits would 
suffer), with those people out of work and receiving benefits who were not 
restrained by family or other circumstances, and thereby could be expected to 
work. What this reveals is the government’s short-sightedness—it sought to 
achieve its aims without regard to the damage it was doing to children by 
depriving them ‘access to adequate food, clothing, warmth and housing, the 
basic necessities of life’,65 circumstances described by Lady Hale as not of their 
making. Exposing the absurdity of the government’s aims, Lady Hale 
emphatically rejected the ‘major aim’ of incentivising work and reforming the 
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benefits culture as having ‘little force’ in the context of lone parents.66 This case 
illustrates that regardless of the polycentric nature of a case, challenging the aims 
that the government seeks to achieve can be done without engaging in wholesale 
reform of a policy area. Moreover, this case also demonstrates the freshness 
which a judicial approach brings, coupled with the strong powers of reasoning 
and meticulous scrutiny which were undertaken by the two dissenting judges in 
this case. Lastly, a more activist approach has the benefit of not only legitimising 
the courts by using rational criteria and reasoning, as identified by Feldman,67 
but also in demonstrating the court’s high regard for political equality and 
commitment to a truly representative democracy, by ensuring that the most 
vulnerable in society have a basic minimum level of subsistence needed to 
ensure a community of equals. 
 
 
III. THE WAY FORWARD: CONSTITUTIONAL HURDLES OR 
SPRINGBOARDS? 
 
The aim of this paper has been to argue that there is a good case for judicial 
adjudication of social rights. It should be borne in mind that I am not dealing 
with the issue of social rights forming part of a constitution, subject to final 
strong judicial review with the courts striking down and having the final say on 
the lawfulness of legislation, but with the unique constitutional context provided 
by the Human Rights Act (1998). As elucidated above, in UK courts and in the 
European Court of Human Rights, there is a growing trend towards an 
integrated approach in the interpretation of civil and political rights, in which 
courts are willing to read social interests and rights into documents that 
primarily protect entitlements classified as civil and political. Given the 
promising use of this approach, I have sought to deconstruct and refute the 
argument that it is constitutionally appropriate for courts of law to adopt tests 
deeply rooted in a deferential mentality, such as Stec v UK.68 As such, I argue that 
courts should have the confidence to fully engage with the integrated approach, 
without feeling that they are exceeding their constitutional parameters. They 
should apply the proportionality test without heightening parts of the test to a 
Wednesbury-type review, as Stec does. This section seeks to further defend this 
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claim by reference to the structure of the Human Rights Act itself. In particular 
I point to the conducive nature of the Human Rights Act (particularly sections 3 
and 4) to this type of adjudication and the scope for dialogue and 
incrementalism.69 
The Human Rights Act 1998 
My aim here is to point to the features of the Human Rights Act which 
complement my thesis and provide the ideal context for adjudication of social 
rights. I argue that since the Act upholds the principle of parliamentary 
sovereignty and upholds a model of judicial review which has in-built 
mechanisms for dialogue, sceptics need not be concerned about the effects of 
judicial adjudication on social interests. Indeed, given that critics may point to 
the breach of the separation of powers as well as the unknown consequences of 
how the executive may react to greater judicial adjudication of social rights, I 
wish to clarify a key point. It must be remembered that I am advocating for a 
close and meticulous scrutiny of measures or pieces of legislation that are 
alleged to have breached the basic minimum required to live a dignified life. I 
am not arguing for the courts to design the budget or demand the executive to 
implement a particular policy, I simply want them to apply the proportionality 
test—to decide on questions of law. In this way the government has space to 
reconsider its policy choices and design them in a rights compatible manner, 
with ultimate decisions relating to methods and financial planning remaining 
with the government. So how can the Human Rights Act facilitate relations 
between the judiciary and executive if the courts decide to engage more actively 
in social rights adjudication? 
Firstly, it should be noted that the Human Rights Act preserves 
parliamentary sovereignty in the sense that through s 3(2)(c) and s 4(6)(a) any 
declaration of incompatibility does not affect the validity of legislation under 
scrutiny, it simply places the executive and legislature under immense political 
pressure to change the legislation. Should the courts be unable to interpret 
legislation compatibly with convention rights under Section 3 (‘s 3’),70 which is 
often the case in the face of a blatant breach of rights, the role of Section 4 (‘s 
69 King (n 53) 9. 
70 The Human Rights Act 1998. 
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4’)71 would be key and it is what s 4 promotes and espouses that is of 
significance to my argument. 
Section 4 and Scope for Dialogue 
Section 4 allows the elected branches to decide on how to deal with a ruling on 
the incompatibility of legislation with a Convention72 right. In this sense, as a 
ruling does not automatically affect the validity of legislation, polycentric 
concerns are not as applicable as the elected bodies have the ultimate say on 
how to proceed with a declaration of incompatibility. However, due to the 
political pressure the elected branches usually do respond to s 4 declarations, but 
given the possibility of outcry over greater judicial activism in social rights 
adjudication, we need to anticipate how the courts could deal with this 
possibility and how their use of s 4 could facilitate this further. In this regard, I 
point to the importance of the principle of incrementalism, as described by 
King, a useful rule of thumb, and ‘what the principles of restraint ordinarily 
recommend.’ 73 According to Jowell, incremental steps are those that require 
only a small departure from the status quo, and for ‘substantive administrative 
or legislative flexibility by way of response’.74 This is where the courts will need 
to be careful about how they frame these disputes and the demands they make 
from the government. In other words, courts must allow for administrative or 
legislative flexibility by way of response. In this way, the courts can scrutinise 
legislation for its compatibility with human rights law without having the last 
word on how resources will be distributed. For Gearty and Mantouvalou this is 
appropriate due to the fact that judges might not always have the ‘overview or 
systematic knowledge of the budget’ in comparison to the executive branch of 
government.75 Moreover, this model of judicial review can also lead to a 
dialogue between the courts and elected branches of government. Note here 
that I am not arguing that the declaration of incompatibiltiy should be used 
more often because it facilitates dialogue. Clearly, if the court can legitimately 
use s 3  to deliver a remedy for a claimant it should, but given current judicial 
71 ibid. 
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reticence and hesitancy to engage in social rights adjudication, s 4 provides a less 
radical alternative to sceptics when compared to s 3, given that it does not 
deliver an immediate remedy and gives Parliament space to respond. It could be 
argued that s 3 might be the better option given that it provides remedial relief 
to litigants, but whether use of s 3 will be appropriate is a context specific 
question. The advantage of a s 4 declaration is that it imposes great political 
pressure to remedy a breach and provides space for the executive to reconsider 
its approach to policy in making it rights compatible. Kavanagh argues that s 3 is 
limited by terms of the law, the broader legislative scheme of which the 
incompatible clause is a part, and past precedent.76 Indeed, it must be 
remembered that the court does not have the power to enact another statute 
whereas Parliament has the ability to legislate at any time. This leads to a major 
concern relating to both s 3 and s 4—if Parliament is ultimately sovereign and 
can enact an amendment to undo a s 3 interpretation and choose to ignore a s 4 
declaration of incompatibility, thereby showing its unwillingness to reform an 
area of law despite questions on its lawfulness, can it truly be claimed that 
Human Rights Act is of a conducive nature? 
The answer must still be yes, for the track record of the government 
responding to s 4 declarations should give us confidence. Indeed, although 
Kavanagh expresses concerns about the “dialogue metaphor”, we see the 
strength of the s 4 argument by pointing to the power of a court ruling that a 
legal wrong has been committed—a compelling constitutional factor 
underpinned by the rule of law, which places Parliament under a strong 
obligation to change the law in light of the declaration. Another line of 
argument by Kavanagh posits that s 4 does not really throw the ball back in into 
Parliament’s court. Although this may be true given the past track record, it is 
key to first understand that respect for the rule of law is a vital part of our claim 
to democracy, such that there should be respect for rulings relating to the 
lawfulness of measures or laws, and second, courts are giving Parliament the 
time and space to reconfigure its policy approach to ensure that it is rights 
compliant and lawful. This is sensible as a large amount of state money is spent 
on welfare spending. As such, providing Parliament with the choice of how to 
muster a suitable rights-compliant legislative solution to a declared breach is a 
way of respecting the separation of powers whilst at the same time recognising 
the importance of ensuring that basic minimum needs are not neglected by 
76 Kavanagh (n 16) 277. 
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Parliament. This is how the dialogue metaphor can be revived to meet the more 
unique demands of social rights adjudication. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has rejected the idea that the courts are not constitutionally suited to 
adjudicate on social rights under an integrated approach. I have suggested that 
courts have good reasons to adopt an incrementalist position which emphasises 
the importance of dialogue. Moreovoer, by overseeing measures and laws that 
deal with the social minimum required for an adequate standard of living and 
subsistence, the courts demonstrate their commitment to political equality which 
is a vital pre-condition for representative democracy. As such, the courts need 
not adopt heightened tests which are underpinned by a deferential mindset. 
Rather, courts should decide based purely on the proportionality test. Lastly, the 
Human Rights Act is conducive to social rights adjudication. It has room for 
dialogue and gives the government space to reconfigure its policy choices, 
removing concerns about courts making policy or designing budgets. 
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